n,c wro (IJI{/ /1111110/l rig/its status to those in the WTO. A majority of states arc parties to both the WTO Single Undertaking (thz: core WTO treaties) and the ICESCR. The principle of decentralization without hierarchy, along with that of giving full effect to international obligations, implies the need to interpret and to develop these regimes in a complementary and consistent fashion to the extent possible. As the n:port of the International Law Commission ("ILC') on fragmentation of international law notes: 'In international law, there is a strong presumption against normative con llict' .' 1 Since the WTO Seattle Ministerial, now almost a decade ago, there has been ;1 concerted effort in the international human rights community, by activists, academics, and the Office of the High Commissioner to overcome this isolationism, attempting to understand how trade affects the realisation or human rights and what implications human rights obligations have for the interpretation and negotiation of trade agrcerncnts_·'i It is fair to say that these efforts have not been matched by a comparable openness on the part of the international trade law and policy community: the WTO negotiations in the Doha Round arc occurring without any explicit reference to human rights.
Thl'. Cold War legacy of economic and social rights brought with it an association with discredited collectivist approaches to economic and social organisation. The concept was often viewed as polari1,ing along East/West, North/South l"ault lines; this is a heritage that must be overcome if economic and social rights arc to gain purchase in the international economic regimes. The conventional economic policy ideology prevalent in the international trade law and policy knowledge communities views the issues surrounding access to essential services, food, housing, and healthcare as a matter of tradeoffs under scarcity. From that perspective, there may be a tension between the role of the market in generating the wealth necessary to obtain these goods and the capacity lo guarantee wider access to them through redistribution; thus, speaking of rights in these contexts is often viewed as incoherent, mere posturing ur wishl"ul thinking. The problem here is a lack of awareness in the international trade policy community about how econolllic and social rights have been interpreted and elaborated in the policy and practice ofthc international human rights institutions.
At the sarne time, the collapse of the Washington Consen.sus, the mixed track record or 'liheral' economic reform in contrihuting to imprnvclllcnt in living stnndards in devdoping countries, and the new economics of globalisation rcllcct a fumlame11tal crisis or conlidence in the capacity of ccrn1<1mics oriented towards libernlisation or global markets to provide a universal 'formula' l'or the attainment of human wcll-being. 6 There is an absence today of a plausible, agreed normative cconolllic framework that can infor111 debates about globalisation as well as related domestic reforms. This provides a window or opportunity for international human rights law to supply an alternative normative structure for such a debate. T<J realise this possibility. rights must be capable of being linked to specific policy options and choices ,md must be capable of translation into a framework for an,tlysing the effects of alternative trade and related domestic policies. including alternative possible new rules i11 trade agreements. The pro111ising work of Armartya Sen 011 development as freedom may be highly relevant in lhis regard. 7 The /)cc/urution 011 Tmdc Re/med /11tcl!cc11wl Pm11crl_\· Rights und the Pu/Jlic flealrh 8 and the Ki111/wrle_,, (Conflict /) ia11w11(/s) Waii·cr<J reflect an unacknowledged debt lo human rights consciousness in the WTO. The currrnt Director-General ol" the WTO, Pascal Lamy. has written about glohalis,ttion with a human face and his conception or the economic sphere. including the international economic sphere. is deeply rooted in the notion of hurnanity. lO More recently. a joint study hy the ILO and the WTO SL'.crctariat explicitly refers to freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining as ·universally recogni1.cd human rights', urges their respect as such (and not just for instrumental reasons of social peace). and refutes with empirical cvidcm:l'. the notion that respect for such rights harms compclitivencss. 11 6 Sec, for example. [) Rudrik. The G!o!Jil! c;o1·e1m111n· of" frllifl': us i( /)c1·c!opmc111 l?co!!r Mol!ercd (United Nations Development Progran11l1L'. (iL·ncva. 2001 ) . 7 Sec, for cxampk, Amartya Sen. l>nclo;m1rnr (I.I i'lecd/J/11 (; \nchor Booh.s. New York. 2000 ).
x Reconstructing globalisation on the basis or a human rights consciousness, and in particular with a view to fully realising the vision of the ICESCR, is a dau11ti11g task which would need to engage many policy disciplines and many institutions. Apparent lack of consensus concerning the legal status and precise meaning or some social and economic rights is an obstacle to their inllucnce in the international trade regime.
In our view. a short-to medium-tenn strategy is needed to identify some fairly erecisc and SJJecijic interconnections between the legal concepts and doctrines in the treaty texh of both regimes. As international lawyers whose collective expertise extends across both regimes, we seek in this chapter to conceive the challenge as a legal question of the interaction and interpretation or treaty norms. 12 But how does one achieve that deeper level of cooperation and cross-cornmunication, given the different languages or idioms in which the human rights community and the trade policy community understand the challenges or globalisation'> When we examine the features or the WTO treaties as legal instrumentsas opposed to the way that the trade policy community has often viewed the WTO regime -it quickly becomes evident that the treaties themselves have been structured in many ways so as to ensure that the means adopted in the WTO to achieve economic goals arc not inconsistent with the human purposes and values intrinsic to the norms in the ICESCR.
The preamble to the WTO Agreement states the purposes of the WTO system in terms that arc broadly consistent with the human ends that underlie the rights in the ICESCR:
... raising standards of living. ensuring lull employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trmlc in goods and services. while allowing f"or the optimal use of the world's resource'> in accordance with the objective of" sustc1inahle development. seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of ecomm1ic development. Rcn1g11i:i11g further that there is need for positive efforts de.signed lo en.sure that developing countric,'-.. and i::speci,dly the lea.st developed alllong them. secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.
The values that permeate the WTO preamble gel with the obligation provision in Article ::?.(I) ICESCR, which reads:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and throufh international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and lcchni-Sec generally International Law Commission. above n 3. linonrl t!tc c!il'irlc 4J caL to the maximum or its ,l\'ailahk resources, with ,1 view to achieving progressively the rull n:nlization of thl'. righh recug11i1.ed i11 the present Covenant hy all ,q,propriatc 111ca1b. including pi1rticularly the adoption ol lcgislativc lllL'asurL·s.
It is dil'ficult to imagine how the progressive fullil111e111 of econo111ic and social rights could be achieved, particularly i11 developing coun1ries, without the advancement of the goals stated in the WTO Preamble. Furthennon~. it should he noted that Article 2 ICESCR clearly indicates that the responsibility <'f states is engaged not just individually with respect to the rights of persons 011 1heir territory hut also with respect to international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical.
In most cases, the WTO trea1ies contain exceptions or li111itations claus:cs that allow deviation from trade lihcr,llisa1ion rules where the realisation or fundamental human values, such as health, is al stake. This approach has not been fully honoured or achieved in all respects in existing WTO Llw, especially in the case of intellectual property rights. Even in these c;1ses, much of the problem, however, is arguably a question of the interpret,1tion of the existing treaty rules in the WTO. In some other instances. on which we shall elaborate. commitments within these rules to address econolllic and :-.ocial rights-related concerns have not been properly illlplclllented.
The exercise of interpretation and implementation provides an international law~hased means or advancing the consistency of the WTO treaty regime with the ICESCR. that is a means that docs not depend 011 the broader tran,o.;forlllation or international economic policy or a political rebalancing or globalisation.
With respect to interpretation, the Appellate Body or the WTO has suggested that non-WTO legal norms have severnl uses in WTO dispute settlement, such as, for example, the interpretation of exceptions to WTO obligations (for example, the interpretation of 'exhau-;tible 11,1tural resources' in Article XX CiATT 11 in the Shri111p/for1le 14 case): the articula~ tion of legal benchmarks related to the situation in developing countries (for example. the interpretation of the meaning of 'development needs' in the f-,;c -TttrifJ:1,I) case): the establishment or an international recognition ol In any case, the Appellate Body of the WTO has used international law as reflective of hroad agreement in the international community even where not all or the parties to dispute were bound by the instrument in question (the Rio Co111·cntion 22 in Shri11111ffor1/e).
One limit on the use or non-WTO law reflected in the recent Mexico -S(4i Drinks 21 case is that the Appellate Body will not on its own make a determination as to whether a particular WTO Member has violated its obligations under a non-WTO legal in.strument. This does not significantly narrow the role for non-WTO law in interpretation. Regarding economic social and cultural rights, the issue will not normally be whether a WTO Member has violated a ir, E11ro11e1111 Cm1111H111ities -Mca.rnre.1 Conccming !vlcot a/Ill Mem Products, WTO Doc WT/DS2(1/i\B/R, AH-1997 -4 (13 February 1998 provision or the ICESCR, but rather_ what is necessary in terms or relaxation of WTO disciplines for the Member to fulfil its duties under the ICESCR.
There arc narrower or more expansive ways or reading the idea ol consistency between treaty norms in the ICESCR and those in the WTO. In this commentary, we have chosen to focus on a relatively narrnw conception: nan1cly the notion that one treaty regime should not undermine the existing ctlectivencss or the other. This docs not mean that in the longer run it would not be desirable to explore the possibility of restructuring the WTO system to enhance the capacity of states to respect. protect and fulfil the rights in the ICESCR. Our estimate is, however, that the current level of dissent about the relationship of trade liberalisation to economic dcvelopme11t. and the divergent views of different states on notions or equity in the WTO system, make this a dif!icult agenda to pursue for the rnomcnL from the perspective of the UN human rights institutions and the WTO itself.
Instead, we have decided to concentrate 011 a set of situations where the concern is that the WTO treaty regime could operate to undermine ICESCR norms such that the effects would almost universally be viewed as unacceptable by states and peoples with different positions and perspectives on many of the fundamental debates about economic globalisation, development and global justice.
Herc we avert to the concept or human security, as articulated in the 200] Report of the UN Commission on Human Security: lhlurnan security complements human development by deliberately locusin!,' on downside risks. It rccognil'.es the conditions 1ha1 menace survival, the continuation of daily life and the dignity or hurnan beings ... 1 luman security helps identify the rights at stake in a particular situation. And human right-, help answer the question: How should human security he promoted' 12 -l A focus on human security so articulated is broadly consistrnt with the idea of 'minimum core obligation' and 'minimum essential levels' of economic, social and economic rights, which k1s been articulated by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ( ·cESCR' J. 2 :<i Making economic, social and cultural rights as they rclatt..: to basic human security a priority, and addressing the risk or human security being undermined by the WTO treaty regime, is justified not only because or the broad consensus around human security-related norms, but also due to the fact that The WTO a11d hu1111m rigllls the progressive f'ultillmcnt or all the rights in the ICESCR clearly depends on sucial ,md political conditions that arc fundamentally compromised when human security itself is threatened. A minimum or human security is in many ways a prerequisite for the social cooperation, citizen and worker participation, and good governance that arc needed if the full vision or the Covenant is to he achieved in each country. Conversely, when human security is menaced, whether by economic crisis, natural disaster or war, the acquis of social, economic and cultural rights can he rapidly undermined. Moreover, where human security it.self is threatened by the denial of economic, social and cultural rights, the rights in the J11ternatio11ul Covrnant 011 CiFil and Political Ri!!,hf.1· ('ICCPR') 2 <, are likely to be menaced or unachievable, as well.
Not all Members of the WTO are parties to the ICESCR, but in the case of the human-security dimensions of rights such as the right to health, to food, and to work, even non-parties of the Covenant have participated in various legal and policy instruments and initiatives that affirm these dimensions.
whether the declaration on core labor rights or the International Labor Organi1,ation ( 'ILO' ) 27 or the Food and Agricullurc Organi1.ation's ( 'FAO'} initiatives on rood sccurily, 2 x or the World Health Organization's constitution, which affirms the right to health as rundamental. 2 l) Moreover, the human security dimensions of economic and social rights arc arguably already implicit in the notion or the right to life in the ICCPR. 10
In our view, the connection or the rights in the ICESCR to human security makes these rights something more than provisions of a specialised treaty regime. They form part of what the Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission refers to as the 'normative environment' of the international legal order, which must he taken into account in interpreting and applying particular treaties. 11 This presupposes that there is a minimum substantive normativity inherent in the international legal order, a kind of foundation or floor, grounding the aspirations and efforts of the international legal system. It is our view that the notion of human security captures this ~<i Sec Art 6( I) IC 'CPR.
International I .,1w Commission. above n 3. 141 Sff. I. minimum subst;mtive universal normativity. The idea or hu111,111 security as such a normative floor for the interpretation and ,ipplication or the WTO trc,1ties is acknowledged in the WTO Appellate Body's suggestion that WTO law must be interpreted and applied in light or the notion that the ·preservation orhuman life and health" is a value that •is vital and important in the highest degree·.-'~ The access to medicines and conflict di,1111onds examples suggest that the international trade regime would be open to human righh culture as a culture of human security. In the case of access to medicines. the WTO Members were prepared to modify the rights and obligations in TRIPS in order to facilitate affordable access to medications necessary to deal with devastating lifethreatening illncss. 33 In the case of conflict diamonds, the WTO Members created a waiver that arlirmcd as a mailer or legal certainty that Members could restrict trade in diamonds to conllict areas in a manner consistent ,vith their WTO obligations (this is especially 1wtahlc, because such restrictions could anyhow have been justiliable as an exception under the rclev.int WTO trealy).'-1 These examples show that the WTO as a treaty community is susceptible to concerns or human security.
In our view, there arc several dimensions to the downside risk that WTO norms may undermine or be inconsistent with the human security dimensions or social. economic and cultural rights; appreciation or these concrete dimensions allows us lo 111ake very concrete suggestions as to how such ten~ions between treaty regimes can be addressed within the idiom and structures 01· international law.
DOMESTIC POLICY SPACE
Various WTO treaties contain constraints on the ability or WTO Mcrnhcrs to use domestic policy instruments, whether compulsory licensing in the case 01· TRIPS, subsidies including lood subsidies in the case or the S11/J.1iclic.1 wul Countervuifing Mea1111·cs i\grccmenl ( "SCM")-'-~ and the Agrcc111c111 on ·' 2 1:·11mpcwr C11111m1111ifies
A1eu.111res 1t/1£'cli11g Ashe.1/os and ;\shc.1/os-Co11tuini11g Pmi/11cts, WTO Doc WT/DS 115/AB/R {00-1157) AB-2000-11 L'1 i\pril 2001) \1741 (Report or the Appellatl.' Body) ("FC---A1hewo1· AB!?"). This rn,l.' is discussed below in connection with the right to health.
33
Sec the !)oho /)cc/uratinn 011 tlu: TR/I'S Agree111cn1 und /'11h!ic lleulth. WTO Doc WT/MIN/01 )/DEC/2 (20 November 2001 ). q Sec ahovc n 9.
The WTO one! h11111a11 rights Agriculture, 3 r 1 or industrial policy measures such as local content require-111cnts.'7 In addition, WTO Members could bind themselves under the Gcnf'ml /\grccmcnt 011 Trude in Sen·ices ('CATS' ):,x to liberalise market access in sectors related to essential services, such as health care and water, limiting in important ways their ability to impose public goals related to the human security dimensions of economic and social rights (such as universal affordable access to clean water) on private economic operators who have a right to participate in the market under the GATS commitments. So far, there have been kw cornrnitrnents negotiated that directly affect such public services; in the current round or negotiations, NGO activists have effectively raised awareness or the risks to policy space, and to human rights, of acceding to demands or somt.: WTO Members for guaranteed market access in these arcas.'IJ With respect to policy space. there are several very specific legal challenges posed by the.sc aspects of the WTO regime. First. it must he ensured that existing llexihilities in the treaties, including exception and limitation clauses (such as those in Article XX GATT) arc interpreted was to allow WTO Members to meet their obligations with respect to human-security dimensions ol' economic and social rights. In addition, tht.: J'ull implementation of flexibilities that have already been added by agreement of WTO Members, for instance those based on the /)o/w /)ec/amtion on TRIPS mu/ Puhlic Health, 40 must he guaranteed.
Third, areas where enhanced or new flexibilities arc required in order to ensure that WTO Members can meet their obligations with respect to human security dimension.s of economic and social rights must be identified <for instance, the inclusion of emergency safeguards in the CATS and the creation of a 'safe ir, M11rm/,csh i\grc'c111e11I 1~·s1uhlishi11g Tire World 7i·ode Orguni;:iltion, orened !'or signature 15 Apri I 1994. 186 7 LINTS 1 ( enten:d into force I January 1995 L annex I A (Agrecnw111 on /\gricu[/tlre). n Such measures an: generally prohibited under the Mormkcsh Agrce111c111 l:'.1111hfishi11g rlw World llrnle 01guni::111io11, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 LJNTS :1 (entered into force I January 1995 ), annex haven' for subsidies necessary for the realisation of human sccurity~rclatcd human rights). Finally, instances where propo....,cd new WTO disciplines.
including additional co111mit111cnts in services sector lihcralisation. may risk constraining policies necessary to realise the human security dimensions of economic. social and cultural rights must be identified with as much precision as possible (for example, water privatisation and GATS).
As a general matter, it is important that policy space he understood as a permissive concept: allowing flexibility to a WTO Member to use a particular policy instrument need not imply that this will be the optimal or desirable instrument for realising a given economic or social right in all contexts. For example, in some national contexts, monopolisation and privatisation of essential services may lead to greater access ,ind lower prices. thus helping to fulfil the economic and social rights in question: in others. the effects may he higher prices and universal access may be comprnmiscd.
A. The Direct Effects on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights of Reduction in Trade
While the trade policy community has generally assumed that reduction in explicit trade han-icrs such as tariffs leads to increased overall dolllc.stic welfare in WTO Members, more recent economic research has shown that opening up domestic markets to foreign competition leads to social and economic dislocation in many countries: this social and economic dislocation affects the enjoyment of human security dimensions or social and economic rights such as the right to work. The challenges we sec here arc firstly, to facilitate the best possible c.r 1111/e analysis of what the likely effects will be in a given country of increased competition from imports due to negotiated reduction or trade harriers, including on particularly vulnerable groups. Additionally, where the overall balance of effects is positive, but there arc negative impacts on the enjoyment hy some individuals and groups or human security-rdated dimensions or eco110111ic, social and cultural rights, specific policy strategics must be formulated to address these possible negative impacts (adjustment policies, for ex,unplc) and to ensure that such policy responses arc permissible under WTO rules (which relates to policy space, as discussed above). Some of the strategics in question may imply agreement on technical assistance or development aid, in the case of developing countries. Third. in cases where the negative effects have not been anticipated, steps must be taken to ensure that there is sufficient po.s.sibility within the WTO treaty regime for temporary reversal of market opening commitments to deal with effects on human security dimensions of economic. social and cultural rights ('safeguards'), or through actual rebalancing of commitments of the particular WTO Member. Finally, the actual effects of 'i() T/w WTO 111l/l /111111011 rig/Ifs trade liberalisation commitments on the enjoyment or human security-related di111c11.sions of economic, social and cultural rights must be analysed ex post, so as lo provide a basis where necessary for adjustment of commitments through rurthcr multilateral negotiations, where challenges appear to he common to a range or WTO Members. 111 the next part of this chapter, we proceed to examine aspects of rights in the Covenant that arc directly and obviously connected to the concept of human security, and clements or which have been affirmed in terms of legal obligation in a variety of other instruments and institutions. We have chosen the right to work, the right to health and the right to food, although there arc others as well, no doubt. Civen our international law-based approach, we l"ocus on those aspects of the interaction of the WTO system with these rights that arc most closely grounded in existing treaty norms and their interpretation, related commitments and instruments, and matters that arc the subject of existing treaty-rule negotiations in the present Doha Round.
THE RIGHTS TO WORK, HEALTH AND FOOD IN INTERACTION WITH THE WTO REGIME

A. The Right to Work
Article 6 of the Covenant provides:
( 1 ) The States; Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which include, the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts. and will take appropriate \!cps to safeguard this right.
(2)
The steps to he taken by a Stale Party to the present Covenant to achieve the full realisation of this right shall includl.' technical and vocational guidance and training programs, policies and lechnique.s to achieve steady economic_ social and cultural developmcnt and full and productive employment under conditions safeguarding fundamental political and ectmomic fn:cdoms to lhl' individual.
(i) Human security, international trade, and worker dislocation
Thl'. human security di1nensio11 of the right to work has been idcntiiied by the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the body which monitors implementation and compliance with ICESCR, in its General liheralis,1tion and foreign competition may threaten .-;urvival so understood unless appropriate adjustlllent policies arc undertaken. It should he recalled that the Preamble ol the WTO Agreement alforns the co111111itment of WTO Members that "their relations in the lield ol trade and ccunomic l'lldeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards or living, ensuring full cmpluymcnt and a large and steadily growing volume or real income and effective demamr. Roth the negotiation and npplication or WTO rules must he guided by this commitment, inler u!ia. to l'ull employment and raising standards of living, which may be regarded :is having largely incorporated the right to work into the WTO regimc_._i:, While the optinwl policies for moving toward full empluyment and higher standards of living may be a matter or controversy in the WTO, from a human security perspective on the right to work, there is an obligation to ensure th:1t survival-threatening jub losses due to trade liberalisation arc predicted and avoided as much as possible through the crafting or trade rule,; and concessions, and that WTO rules permit to member states the policy sp<1cc to address the impact on the right to work through appropriate adjustlllent policies, such as retraining, education. and income support. This includes the kinds of policies explicitly indicated in J\rticlc 6(2) ICESCR. In this respect Wl'. note that the Secretariats of both the !LO and the WTO have e111phasised the importance of active labour market policies in tlH.:ir recent report on c111ploy111ent and trade:
Active labour market policies may also he ,1 useful tuol to l'acilitatc adjustment to changes in the structure of production brought almut by trade lihcrali,mion. Measures Ill provide retraining lor displaced workers and job se,1rch as.sista11ce tu facilitate labour mobility will he import,rnt i11 thic. urn11L-clill11.._ 1 '
It should be acknowledged that many adjustment policies such ,ls funding for generally available vocational training arc entirely consistent \Vith WTO rules. However, as expl:1incd below, if policies arc targeted at specilic sectors or lin11s with adjustment needs, there is a risk of the policies being viewed as impermissible subsidies.
What is firstly required is a serious effort to aso,;ess and cstimate c.r ill/le the possible negative cmploy111ent impacts of alternative positions in WTO negotiations. with special attention to the duty of 11on-discri111inatio11 in Article 2(2) ICESCR and therefore the distrihutio11 of potential employment effects along gender lines as well as the other statuses enumerated therein. Complementing this would be the provision of technical assistance to States that arc unahlc otherwise to make such estimates, along with a structure and timetable to negotiations that permit such assessments to influence the negotiation of concessions and treaty rules in a timely and effective fashion. Moreover, effective ·safeguard' provisions in WTO Agreements, which allow WTO Members adequate policy space to deal with negative effects of trade concessions on the right to work, must be introduced, especially where the effects have not been predicted or predictable through cx antc assessment.
A fourth relevant measure would he a plan by each Member as to how it will safeguard the right to work given anticipated negative employment affects 011 some sectors due to trade concessions. Finally, the program would be completed via interpretation and rerhaps modification of WTO rules on subsidies and safeguards. and perhaps other rules as well. in order to allow WTO Members to address the threat to human security from trade liberalisationinduced job losses (or indeed dislocation for other reasons that threatens human security).
(ii) Subsidies
Policies that rrovide a financial contribution to a recipient and a hcnelit (that is, a competitive advantage) and that arc specific to particular industries or sectors, may he actionahlc 'subsidies' under the SCM, depending on their effects on international trade. Article 8 SCM originally entailed a defined list of suhsidies to be deemed 'non-actionable', those subsidies were immunised from challenge in WTO dispute settlement as well as countervailing duty action, even if they were to be found to meet the criteria discussed above. This list included certain subsidies for research and development, environmental protection, and to disadvantaged regions. However, this provision for deemed non-actionability applied provisionally, for only the first live years that the SCM was in force. Since its cfTcctive expiration, WTO Members have been unable to agree to either continue with the list as it now stands or to create a different list. Therefore, today there arc no subsidy programs that arc explicitly protedcd as non-actionable. During the Doha Round negotiations, proposals from dcveloring countries (most notably Venezuela and Cuba) have emerged for the reinstatement of a category of non-actionable subsidics. 44 l-l Sec, c:.g. WTO doc. TN/RL/W /41 /Rev. l. IO March, 200] .
!Jcymul rhc divide
Based upon the _joint work of the ILO and the WTO, and in collaboration with the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, it should he possible to draw up a list or policy in.struments, including those ,tlready mentioned in Article 6 ICESCR, that may be nece.ss,iry for WTO Members to enact. in order to address the human security di mens ions ol" the right to work. and particularly to prevent the threat to human security through loss or employment from trndc-libcralisation induced industrial dislocation. These policy instruments could form part of a new ·non-actionable' category in an amended SCM in the Doha Round.
Moreover, in the case of those instruments explicitly indicated in Art 6 SCM, any interpretation of the agreement should be based on a presumption thut, since most WTO Members were bound by the ICESCR when they negotiated the SCM, Members deemed the instruments in question consistent with SCM. This derives from the basic international law principle that. to the extent possible, the interpretation or one treaty should not render obligations under other treaties ineffective. This may have significance in the intcrpret,ition or specificity, which is a complex judgment not determined by bright line rules. 111 particular, Article 2.1 (h) SCM appears to be aimed al guaranteeing some policy space !'or subsidies that arc provided on the basis or 'objective criteria':
Where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant to \\-'hich the granting authority operates. e,1.;tablishcs objective criteria or conditions governing the eligihility for, and the anrnunl ol', a subsidy, ,pcciticity shall not l'Xi.,l. prnvidcd that the eligibility is automalic and that such criteria and conditions arc strictly adhered to. The criteria or conditions mmt be clearly spelled out in law, regulation. or other ofiicial document, so as to be capable of verification.
Arguably, subsidy measures aimed at realising the right to work should he deemed to have been understood to rail within the notion or measures based on 'objective criteria or conditions·, where the features of these programs arc reasonably related to the right to work as articulated in Article (i or the CovL:nanl.
TRIMS identifies some investrnent-related 111easures that arc deemed to he impermissible under the WTO. These include me,1sures that require an enterprise to use local content or sourcing in its production activities; such measures arc deemed to be inconsistent with Article Ill:4 GATT. the national treatment obligation. However. TRIMS also provides that the exceptions otherwise applicable to the GATT apply as well in the case of TRIMS that arc deemed to violate specific provisions of the GATT. Thus. where a Member needed to impose such requirements in the context of a national economic crisis, for instance, to prevent the enjoyment of the right to work being undermined. the measures might be _justi1iable under Article XX(a) GATT, as necessary for the .'i4 'f'/1c WTO ond l1111111111 rigflls rrotection or public morals. 111 the US -Gw11/Jli11g 45 decision, the Appellate Body rcrerred to public morals in Article XIV GATS as concerning "the preservation of the fundamental interests of a society, as reflected in public policy and law' _ 4 r, Almost by dclinition, rights recognised intern~1tionally c:111 be considered ·ru11dame11tal interests ... as reflected i11 ... law'.
With respect to the right to work as it is relevant to employment in service industries, the G/\TS docs not contain any explicit disciplines on subsidies in the context of services. The i'uture negotiation of such provisions is anticipated by Article XV (_i/\TS, which recognises the role of subsidies in the development programs of developing countries.
It has been argued that the national treatment obligation in the GATS.
which prohibits discrimination against like services and service providers or other WTO Member~, would make subsidies targeted al local workers quest ionahlc.'-17 However, a WTO Member might be able to offer subsidies to any service provider with a commercial presence and the capacity to create employment or train workers in the Member concerned.
Article XIX GATT provides that a WTO Member may impm,c 'safeguards' on a temporary basis. increasing tariffs above the ceilings it has committed in WTO negotiations, under certain circumstances where a domestic industry is sufkring injury due to surges in i111ports. The definition or injury includes i11tN uliu a situatiun of declining employment. In light of the right to work the narrow interpretation or saft:guards that is prevalent in WTO jurisprudence may need to be re-examined. A .'>trict demonstration that the event.'> leading to the surge of imports could not reasonably have been foreseen has been required by the Appellate Body in order for a member to invoke safeguards, and also a strict demonstration of a casual relation between the surge of imports and the injury. 48 Since it is hard through economic methodology to identify a surge in imports as a factor separate from others affecting the fate of an industry, 1 '! the consequence is that safeguard relief is very difficult to come Ncwmd 1he cli1'ide _'i'i by in the WTO. Horn and Mavroidis have argued that the rationale for saleguards should he seen in si!lnificant measure as to address social adjustmcnl costs from \r,tdc lihcralisali<~n. 511 · In lighl ol that consideration, ,trc such rc,tdings or the treaty tcxt.s in quc.stion really required. especially given the right to work is relkctcd in the ·full employment' objective stated in tile WTO Agreement Preamblc' 1 Of course, safeguards may have negative impacts on the right to work in the countries or export that arc consequently faced with higher tariffs. However. there arc other facets that balance this concern of the exporting country with the concern for adjustment of the importing country and its workers. These include the requirement that safeguard relief he temporary and that compensation he offered to affected exporting states. Also, there is an obligation on the state taking safeguards to take other adjt1.'->tme11t measures to ensure that the underlying problem is addressed. A proper understanding or the right to work could be relevant lo delining appropriate compensation. determining whether there is an ongoing _justification for sakguards, and what alternative adjustmc:nt policies a Member can be expected lo lake lo address the underlying siluation.
In thi.'-> context, ii should he noted tha! the WTO contains a mechanism for examining the trade-related policies of WTO Members and their effects, the The concept of trafficking includes not only obviously non-consen~ual movement of workers (with coercion or threat of force) but also movement that constitutes exploitation, which would include subjection to employment conditions threatening to human security, that is denial of the minimum human conditions of work as required by the cure content ol J\rt 6 ICESCR. Sec Jacqueline Bhahha, 'frqfficking, Smuggling At the same time, even apart from the specific commitments that WTO Members make with respect to Mode 4 under GATS, the Most-Favoured-Nation clause applies generally to all services trade. This means that, whether or not it has made specific commitments, a WTO Member cannot discriminate between different countries in its approach to regulating services. This raises the issue of whether, even if it had not made any specific commitments, a WTO Member could restrict or prohibit trade in workers from a country that is not taking effective measures to deal with trafficking problems. Presumably here the public morals exception lo CATS obligations could be invoked (Article XIV(a) GATS). The right to work might he used as part of the nonnative context for interpreting this exception. Again, since there is lillle awareness or attention in the WTO to the situation of migrant and traflicked workers, it is important that the relevant agencies provide guidance as to appropriate measures l"or addressing the human security ol" such persons. to ensure tlwt the GATS is interpreted in a manner that allows such measures to be taken and to be effective.
B. The Right to Health
Article 12 ICESCR provides:
I. The States Parties to the present Covenant recogni,.e the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Partit.:s to the present Coven,tnl to achieve the rull realisation or this right shall include those necessary for:
(a)
The provision for the reduction or the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy development or the child:
The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene:
2005) Migration Policy Institute, http://www.migratio11i11rnr111ation.org/Feature/ display.cfm'!iu=290 at 8 August 2008.
The WU) uncl h1111w11 rig/11s (c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic. occupational and other diseases;
The creation of conditions which would assure lo all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness.
(i) Trade in goods
A fundamental aspect of the right to health is the duty of the state to protect against disease and related health risks -especially, from a human security perspective those that are life-threatening or can result in a fundamentally reduced capacity to live with dignity. As the dramatic examples of avian inlluenza and mad cow disease illustrate, in an era of globalisation threats to health security can spread across national boundaries at breakneck pace. through the movement of goods and natural persons. Several WTO treaties have provisions that could limit the ability of WTO Members to control the entry and conditions of sale of imported products in order lo discharge their duty under Article I 2(2)(c) of the Covenant.
In the /:"C -Asheslos case, Canada challenged a health-based ban by France on all asbestos and asbestos-containing products, whether domestic or imported. The panel held that asbestos and asbestos-containing products were 'like' substitute products on the domestic market in France, and therefore that France had violated Article 111:4, the National Treatment provision, which requires that 'like' domestic and i 111ported products be treated evenhandedly.55 In effect, the panel was saying that a product that has a long history of causing loss or human life has to he treated under WTO law the same as a non-lethal substitute, for the sake of free trade. The Appellate Body reversed this ruling, finding that the panel erred in law in deciding that health effects could not he taken into account in the determination of likeness, and went on lo lind that, on account of the different health effects that stemmed from the different physical characteristics of, respectively, asbestos and substitute products that were permitted in France, thcse·two groups of products were 'unlike': there was thus no violation of National Treatmcnt. 56 From the perspective of the right to health, this is a landmark ruling, because it indicates that considerations of health as a human value must be considered not only in interpreting and applying exceptions to WTO disciplines, but in understanding the very scope of those disciplines themselves. Even where an exception exists -as it docs for measures necessary to protect, inter olia, human health -at the same time WTO Mernbers should not he lightly assumed to have undertaken ~~ / ~'uropeon ('0111nu1nities -J\.1eosures 1'\ff'ecting /\shc,\los and / 3 LC -A1hc1101· ABR, 111 hi, I1 l 7 I. Hnond tire t!it·icfc ,'il) in Hie lirs1 place substantive obligations that arc inconsistent with the right to health, when those ohligatio11s can he read ,111d applied otherwi~;e. consistenl with the rules ol i111crpretatio11 in the VCLT. 111 this respect, it is significant thal the Appellate Body went on. even !hough it had already 1-c,Trscd the panel's linding or a violation of 111:4, to make a point of indicating that France's rneasure would in any case have been justified under the health exception in Article XX. In so doing. the Appellate Body noled thal: 'it is undisputed that WTO Members have the right 10 determine the level of protection or health that they consider appropriate in a given situation·. Further the Appellate Body held:
roducls
The 1rnne vital m important I the I cclll111l(lll intcn:.,h ur value.s pursued. the easiL·r ii would he to accept ·necess;1ry· measure, designed lo achieve tho,l' cmk In thi;.. case. the objective pursued hy the 111c,N1rc is the prcscrv,1tio11 ol hunia11 lilc and health through the eliminalion. or reducti()Jl. ol the well-knuwn. and likthrcatcning. health risks posed hy asbestos lihrcs. The valui: pu1·sucd is both vital and important in the highest dcgrcc.'i 1 It is clear that where the WTO adjudicatm concludes that 'the value pursued is both vital and important in the highest degree·. an additional degree or delcrence will be afforded tu domestic regula1ory action airned at vindic1ting the value in question: this in it-.L'lr suggests a particular role for !he rights in the Covenant. By binding thernselws to respect. protect and fullil economic. social and cultural rights, the p,1rtics to the Covenant evidence the acceptance or the human values underlying the rights as fundamental --ha, ing priority over less runda111ental. or secondary. lnurnm interests.
(ii) Domestically prohibited products
The issue or domestically prohibited produL·ts illustrates the complexity or the Right to Health in relation to WTO discipline-,_ Article XI GATT bans rL'strictions and prohibitions on exp()rts. Where a WTO Men1hn prohibits the sale of a product 011 grounds ol health ri-.;ks. the member may enact such a ban without regard to whether the sale is domestic or for export. In such a siluation, where the 111easurc is not targeted at exports in particular, would that aspect nevertheless violate Article XI G/\TT) From a right to lll'alth perspective, such a prohibition as applied to exports could be seen as a 1·ulfil111cnt or the duty to engage in international cooperation to ful1il the right to health. There arc concerns that developed countries could 'dump· products which arc viewed as dangerous to health in their domestic spheres on developing countries. which may have limited resources and capacities to detect health risks \vhen products However, on some scenarios the imposition or export controls based on domestic regulatory approaches could undermine the country of irnportation's ability to decide on what is required lo protect the right to health of its own citizl'.ns. Takl'. the example of new L'.xperirnental medications to treat HIV/AIDS. In countries such as the US, such medications may be only available legally on the market after years of clinical trials to ensure their relatively benign effect on human health. Another country's government may determine however that the right to health requires allowing patients access to such novel treatments more rapidly -especially if their health condition is grave in the short term. The logic of a humanity-based conception of international law is that the obligations of human rights arc not limited to a state's own citi1.cns.
However, the ICESCR aflinns a norm or self-determination in Article l, suggesting that each society is entitled to a large degree of autonomy in realising its course of social and economic development.
The issues raised by export of domestically prohibited products have not received any definitive treatment in the WTO itself.."il/ There is a gap here, as the treaty texts do not seem to explicitly address this dilemma, and thus an opportunity to frame this issue, inasmuch as it relates to human health, in terms of the right to health. In the debate over the usefulness of compulsory licensing as an instrument lo ensure affordable access lo essential medicines, it was widely put about that Article 3 I TRIPS did not cover a situation where a developing country wanted to grant a compulsory license in respect oi' ,1 drug it was importing. that is manufactured in another country. Thus, ii" an African country with no indigenous capacity to manufacture compulsorily licensed products wanted to import for its domestic market a generic from India. it could not, it was believed, use Article 31 TRIPS. India could only grant a compulsory license for the Indian domestic 111arket according to the terms of the sa111e. This argument ignores the exception of Article 30 TRIPS_r,o There arc good reasons to (,() Article 30 TRIPS reads as follows:
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred hy a patent, provided tlrnt such exceptions do not unrcasonahly conl"lict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the lcgitimall' intcresh of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate intcrc--.ts of third parties. lhink thal !he granling of a compulsory license could be extended to the market in anolher WTO Member country as an Article 30 TRIPS exception, where that other WTO Member indicates that were it to possess its; own manufacturing capacity, it would itself have granted such a license for production or generics domestically. Such an exception docs not conflict with the normal exploitation of the patent, in the sense that the government of the importing state would be entitled to limit anyhow the patent-holder's right through compulsory licensing, and the only thing that prevents it from doing so is a current lack of manufacturing capacity domestically. It would not fundamentally undermine the palent holder's legitimate interesls because, in the case of a poor country, the amount or revenue forgone would not be subslanlial, and in any case the counlry granting the license (India) would slill have to comply with various conditions (albeit mitigated by the emergency nature or the siluation in the case of HIV/AIDS drugs). For these reasons, in our view, the problem or a poor country not having domestic manufacturing capacity could be solved within the four corners of TRIPS.
However, especially in light of various interpretations issued by !he industry and to some cxtenl rrom within !he WTO Secretariat, many developing countries wanted additional legal security on this point. Thus, Article (1 of the Declaration provides:
We rccogni1,c that WTO Members with insulficicnt or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could race difncultics in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS J\grl.'.ement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to Jind an expeditious solution to this problem and to report lo the General Council before the end ol 2002.
The resulting agreement, as Correa explains:
IT lakes the form of an interim waiver, which allows countries producing patented products under compulsory license tu exporl th<.'. products to eligible importing countries, provided that a compulsory license has :!lso been granted in the importing country. 
C. The Right to Food
Article I I of the Covenant provides:
I. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food. clothing and housing. and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent.
The States
Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and through international co-operation, · the measures, including ,-;pccilic programmes, which arc needed:
To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of Above n 58, 1431.
disseminating knowledge or the principles or nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as lo achieve the most ef'iicient development and utili1,ation of nalural resources: (b) Taking into account the problems or both food-importing and foodexporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution or world food supplies in relation to need.
General Comment 12 on the right to food defines the responsibilities of slates at the intL:rnational lcvd among others: (a) to respect the right to rood in other countries; (b) to facilitate access to food and to provide the necessary food aid when required, but in a manner that docs not adversely affect local producers and markets; and (c) to ensure that in international agreements the right to food is given adequate considcration_hS A 2002 report ol' the Ortice or the UN High Commissioner for Hurrn111 Rights ("OHCHR') considered in depth the implications of agricultural trade rules and negotiations in the WTO for, inter (1/io, lhc right to food. 6 ' > Determining an optinrnl set or international trade rules from the perspective uf fully realising the righ1 to food is a daunting task: the accessibility of food al affordable prices and adequate nutritional quality may depend 011 a careful balance or clements or local capacity and self-suf1iciency and open and competitive world markets. The current rules in the WTO Agree111c11I 011 Agric11/turc may not strike such a balance, requiring 100 much liberalisation or developing countries· agricultural markets that threatens local capacity and self-sufficiency. on the one hand, and 1101 requiring sufficient liberalisation or developed country agricultural markets, on the other. 70 But the negotiations on agriculture in the Doha Round reflect considerable controversy and uncertainty as to the best mix ol' lihcralisalion commitments and safeguards or some aspects of local production.
Even apart from the challenge of devising an optimal set of rules to promote food security through ngricultural twdc liberalisation, however, there is, from a human security perspective, the more basic, and arguably less controversial challenge of ensuring that whatever set of rules is in place docs not have negative effects. including short-term effects. on the realisation of the right to food. and that governments remain able to discharge their responsibilities with respect to the right to food through direct policies such as consumer Tile WTCJ und h1111w11 rigllls subsidies that ensure that food is affordable to their citizens despite price fluctuations on world markets. Along similar lines, the WTO rules concerning export subsidies on agricultural products must be compatible with the proper role ol' i'ood aid in assuring the right to i'ood. In other words, whatever the overall design of agricultural trade liberalisation in the WTO may be, there need to be certain specific legal safeguards or mechanisms to protect the right to i'ood in its most basic human-security related dimensions.
Although not articulated in terms of the right to food. the Marrakesh Decision that accompanied the Uruguay Round Agrt'e111e111 on 1\gricu/ture reflects a recognition of this need for specific safeguards and 111echanisrns.
Because Net Food-Importing Developing Countries ( 'NFIOCs') may experience higher food prices due to the reduction ol' export subsidies as required in the Agreement on Agriculture, special mechanisms arc to be made available under the Marrakesh decision to counter such negative effects. including the establishment or financing mechanisms to ensure affordable acce.s,sibility of imported food. 71 As well, a new Food Aid Con11e111ion was to be established, to lay down appropriate criteria for the granting of food aid consistent with WTO rules. The Convention came into force in 1999. 72 It is widely acknowledged that a number of the specific mechanisms envisaged by the Marrakesh Decision have never been implemented, in particular those requiring compensation or financial assistance to NFIDCs. Despite concerns expressed by the l~AO and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ('UNCTAD' ), both the International Monetary Fund ('IMF') and the WTO have apparently decided not to move forward on such assistance.n The effects of the failure to implement the Marrakesh Decision on the right to food deserve urgent attention: the undertakings in the Decision were integral to the bargain on agricultural trade liberalisation negotiated in the Uruguay Round.
Moreover, in 2007 the Food J\id Cm111e111io11 was up for renegotiation: the deadline for the necessary conversation has since lapsed and the Convention has expired. 74 It may yet be resurrected, btit it is important that proposals for 71 modilication of the Co11ve11tion. concerning issues such as the dq,1rec or concessionality or food aid and targeting or food aid. he examined carefully from the per.spectivc or the right to rond.
Thinking in the WTO 011 the question or rood aid is apparently 111ovi11g in the direction or an approach that would only permit an exception or carve-out for food aid in situation-.: of cmergcncy. 7 " The que.stion is whether ,-.;uch an approach would be consistent with the responsibilities or states in respect of rood aid under the right to food. Would such a constraint i111pede the (klivcry of food aid lo prevent or forestall an emergency occurring. requiring that human disasters have already taken place in order l'or aid to he permissible'! From a hum,111-sccurity perspective. can emergencies he distinguished from situations in a number of developing countrie.s where the human security or people is threatened on ,l daily has is by lack or access to adequ,11e fuod•J In any e,1se. attention lo the impact 011 the right to rood of evolution of ruk·s on rood aid in the Food Aid Com·c111io11 and the WTO i.s clearly warr,mtcd lro111 a human-security perspective.
CONCLUSION
It is ol'te11 suggested that there is a profound normative temion between the regime of human rights on the one hand and that or the WTO 011 the othL'r. The authors or this chapter. holh intcrn,llional lawyers. each with a spccialisc1tio11 in one of the two regimes. do not believe that the issue should he conceived a.-; one of co11l1icti11g legal right.-; and oh! igations. The problem stems largely frrn11 the historical isolation or the institutional culture or the trade regime from that of' the hunwn rights regime. The challenge, both intellectual and praclic,11, is to end this isolation. such that the interpretation and evolution of the norms or the one regime arc conducted in a nwnncr that is consistent with the norms or the other.
With this challenge also comes an exlr:tordinary opportunity to provide, in a post-Cold War context, an urientation for the international trade system that is based on widely agreed norms or human rights and humanity. In the absence of such an orientation. the future evolution of the trading system is likely to he hostage lo conllicting n,1tional and regional interests and pcrspccti\'cs. especially after the collapse of the Washington consensus, and the accompanying scepticism -including among leading economists themselves -about the ability of economics to provide a general rormula for development.
'
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In this chapter, the authors have chosen to focus on aspects of the ICESCR that clearly hear on human security and their interrelationship with WTO treaty norms, both in respect to the interpretation of existing rules and in the context of the continuing evolution of those rules. We believe that human security (here understood in terms of the protection of human life and health) as a fundamental value has already been recognized in various provisions of the WTO Agreements and in their interpretation by the Appellate Body.
As international lawyers, we have sought to focus in particular on the compatibility of different treaty norms and regimes, based on the notion that the avoidance of conflict of norms and the imperative to give effectiveness to all international obligations arc fundamental principles of the international legal systern. This approach leads to the identification of a select number of very concrete issues that may be pursued by the UN human rights institutions with respect to the WTO system, going beyond open-ended debate and speculation about the overall relationship between human rights and globalisation.
We believe that it is through consideration of specific relationships between treaty norms and their interpretation that concern for economic, social and cultural rights can most effectively penetrate the rather isolated institutional culture of the WTO.
